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Given the established empirical foundation, and the  relatively 
underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely 
interested in embodied cognition but are clamoring for more 
mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push 
toward explicit computational models that implement  sensorimotor 
grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. With such models, 
theoretical descriptions can be fleshed out as explicit mechanisms, 
idiosyncratic patterns across experiments may be explained, 
and quantitative predictions for new experiments can be put 
forward.
In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and 
approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied 
computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical 
current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. 
We propose the use of cognitive robotics to implement embodiment, 
and discuss the main prerequisites for a fruitful cross-fertilization 
between empirical and robotics research. Cognitive robotics is a 
broad research area, whose central aim is realizing complete robotic 
architectures that, on the one hand, include principles and con-
straints derived from animal and human cognition and, on the 
other hand, learn to operate autonomously in complex, open-ended 
scenarios (possibly interacting with humans) and have realistic 
embodiment, sensors, and effectors.
IntroductIon
Embodied cognition is a theoretical stance which postulates that 
sensory and motor experiences are part and parcel of the con-
ceptual representations that constitute our knowledge. This view 
has challenged the longstanding assumption that our knowledge 
is represented abstractly in an amodal conceptual network of for-
mal logical symbols. There now exist a large number of interesting 
and intriguing demonstrations of embodied cognition. Examples 
include changes in perceptual experience or motor behavior as a 
result of semantic processing (Boulenger et al., 2006; Meteyard 
et al., 2008), as well as changes in categorization that reflect sensory 
and motor experiences (Smith, 2005; Ross et al., 2007). These dem-
onstrations have received a great deal of attention in the literature, 
and have spurred many researchers to take an embodied approach 
in their own work. There are also a number of theoretical accounts 
of how embodied cognition might work (Clark, 1998; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999). One influential proposal is “perceptual symbols 
system” theory (Barsalou, 1999), according to which the retrieval of 
conceptual meaning involves a partial re-enactment of experiences 
during concept acquisition. However, to a large extent, embodied 
theories of cognition are still developing, particularly in terms of 
their computational implementations, as well as their specification 
with regard to moment-by-moment online processing.
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the external world. Harnad argued that the solution to this problem 
lies in the grounding of symbols in sensorimotor states; in this way, 
internal manipulations are constrained by the same laws that gov-
ern sensory and motor processes. Successively, grounded cognition 
has become the label for a methodological approach to the study 
of cognition that sees it as “grounded in multiple ways, includ-
ing simulations, situated action, and, on occasion, bodily states” 
(Barsalou, 2008a, p. 619). As such, grounded cognition is different 
from, and wider than, embodied or situated cognition, because 
on occasion “cognition can indeed proceed independently of the 
specific body that encoded the sensorimotor experience (Barsalou, 
2008a).” Rather, embodied and situated effects on representation 
and cognition can be conceptualized as a cascade.
EmbodImEnt
On top of conceptual grounding, embodied representations are 
shaped by sensorimotor interactions, and consequently by the 
physical constraints of the individual’s body. Thus, embodiment 
is a consequence of the filtering properties of our sensory and 
motor systems, but this input is already structured and shaped in 
accord with physical principles, and these provide the grounding 
of cognition. For an example of embodiment in the domain of 
numerical cognition, consider the ubiquitous fact that small num-
bers are responded to faster with the left hand and larger numbers 
with the right hand – the spatial–numerical association of response 
codes (SNARC) effect. This effect is weaker in people who start 
counting on the fingers of their right hand compared to those who 
start counting on their left hand (Fischer, 2008; Lindemann et al., 
inpress), presumably because right-starters associate small numbers 
with their right side. This shows that the systematic use of one’s 
body influences the cognitive representation of numbers. Note that 
“embodied cognition” is often used metonymically so as to refer to 
“grounded cognition;” the former label is much more popular than 
the latter, and there is nothing wrong with its use providing that 
one keeps in mind that its literal meaning is restrictive.
SItuatEdnESS
Finally, situated cognition refers to the context dependence of cog-
nitive processing and reflects the possibility that embodied signa-
tures in our performance are context-specific and can be modified 
through experience. This can be a simple change of posture, as in 
the crossing of arms that reveals the dominance of allocentric over 
egocentric spatial coding in the Simon effect (Wallace, 1971). The 
SNARC effect offers two illustrations of this idea. First, a given 
number can be associated with either left or right space depending 
on the range of other numbers in the stimulus set (Dehaene et al., 
1993; Fias et al., 1996). Second, turning one’s head alternatingly 
to the left and right while generating random numbers leads to 
a bias, such that left turns evoke more smaller numbers than do 
right turns (Loetscher et al., 2008). Both examples illustrate how 
the specific situation modulates the grounded and embodied rep-
resentation of numbers (see also Fischer et al., 2009, 2010). 
Although most contemporary theories of grounded cognition 
focus only on a subset of the phenomena that we have described 
here, future theories should tell a coherent story of how all of the 
relevant grounded, embodied, and situated phenomena constitute 
and constrain cognition.
The relationship between theories of grounded cognition and 
cognitive robotics is twofold. On the one hand, theories and find-
ings in research on grounded cognition imply that robot design 
should take into account the fact that a robot’s cognitive capacities 
should not be independent of its design and the modalities it uses 
for interacting with the external environment. This poses oppor-
tunities and challenges for robotics research (Pfeifer and Scheier, 
1999). On the other hand, computational modeling in cognitive 
robotics can contribute to the development of better theories of 
embodied cognition by clarifying and testing some of its critical 
aspects, such as the extent to which embodied phenomena exert a 
causal influence on cognitive processing, thereby suggesting new 
avenues of research. Note that we are interested in computational 
models of embodied cognition in general, and not only for mod-
eling human cognition, although we often use human cognitive 
abilities as examples in this article.
The article is structured as follows. We begin by clarifying the 
usage of some terms. The second section takes the form of a dialog 
between two fictional characters: Ernest, the “experimenter,” and 
Mary, the “computational modeler.” The dialog consists of an inter-
active sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, 
and (tentative) answers. The dialog touches on the most important 
aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational 
modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling 
could have on grounded theories. In the final section, we discuss 
the most important open challenges for embodied computational 
modeling, and suggest a roadmap for future research.
The use of terms such as “grounded” and “situated” is some-
what arbitrary, and these terms are used often interchangeably 
with “embodied.” Because of this issue in the current literature, 
we introduce some definitions at the outset of this article (cf. 
Myachykov et al., 2009; Fischer and Shaki, 2011). Together with 
these definitions, we also provide examples that specifically pertain 
to numerical cognition because this area of knowledge representa-
tion has traditionally been considered as a domain par excellence 
for abstract and amodal concepts, a view we wish to challenge.
GroundInG
At the most general level, cognition has a physical foundation and 
it is, first and foremost, grounded in the physical properties of the 
world, such as the presence of gravity and celestial light sources, and 
constrained by physical principles (at least until we have evidence 
of life and cognition in a virtual reality). One example of grounding 
in the domain of numerical cognition is the fact that we associ-
ate smaller numbers with lower space and larger numbers with 
upper space (Ito and Hatta, 2004; Schwarz and Keus, 2004). This 
association is presumably universal because it reflects the physical 
necessity that the aggregation of more objects leads to larger piles. 
The recognition of the physical foundation of cognition has led 
researchers to challenge traditional theories of cognitive science and 
AI, in which cognitive operations were conceived as unconstrained 
manipulations of arbitrary and amodal symbols. The philosophical 
debate on how concepts and ideas have any meaning and are linked 
to their referents was revitalized by Searle’s (1980) Chinese room 
argument and by Harnad’s (1990) paper on symbol grounding, in 
which he argued that language-like symbols traditionally used in 
AI are meaningless because they lack grounding and reference to 
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one’s recollection of events that involved similar postures, such as 
reclining on a chair and the associated experience of a dental visit 
(Dijkstra et al., 2008).
This body of work seems to confirm the tight coupling between 
sensory and motor maps on the one hand and conceptual process-
ing on the other hand, as postulated by the embodied cognitive 
approach. It does, however, also raise an architectural challenge for 
computational modeling because it seems to require persistent cross-
talk between domain-specific systems to account for the wide range 
of embodiment effects on performance. In terms of computational 
modeling, the main implication of this view is that the specific way 
in which robots act, perceive their external environment, and strive 
to survive and obtain reward, must have a significant impact on 
their cognitive representations and skills, and on how they develop. 
Indeed, this insight has close relations with a limitation that has been 
widely recognized in AI research, namely that cognitive processes 
were implemented by manipulating abstract symbols that were not 
“grounded” in the external world, and were unrelated to the robot’s 
action repertoire and perception (Harnad, 1990).
Research in grounded cognition makes an even stronger case 
for the influence of embodiment on cognition. Not only should 
representations be grounded, but their processing should essentially 
be fully embodied as well, such that there is no central processing 
independent of sensorimotor processes and/or affective experi-
ence. For instance, if we consider again the examples mentioned 
for spatial reasoning and attention, this leads to difficult issues for 
modelers, such as how spatial relations could be transferred to other 
domains (e.g., the temporal domain), or how spatial associations 
of abstract concepts could be simulated. The grounded perspective 
opens new avenues in robotics research, although a number of open 
research issues remain to be addressed.
One general set of issues relative to the realization of embod-
ied cognitive models concerns the computational architecture, 
aside from whether it takes the form of neural networks, Bayesian 
approaches, production systems, classic AI architectures, or another 
form. Ernest, an experimenter, and Mary, a computational modeler, 
discuss these topics.
Requirement 1. Modal versus amodal representations
Mary: What are the most important constraints that grounded 
cognition pose for computational modeling and robotics? And, 
conversely, what are the essential features that computational mod-
els should have for them to be recognized as being “grounded cog-
nitive models”?
Ernest: Perhaps the first and foremost attribute of a grounded 
computational model is the implementation of cognitive processes 
(e.g., memory, reasoning, and language understanding) as depend-
ing on modal representations and associated mechanisms for their 
processing [e.g., Barsalou’s (1999) simulators] rather than on amo-
dal representations, transductions, and abstract rule systems.
Mary: This is a key departure point from most models in AI, 
which use amodal representations. However, don’t you think that 
modal representations, such as for instance visual representations, 
are too impoverished to support cognition? Take for example the 
visual representation of an apple. It could be sufficient to support 
decisions on how to grasp the apple, but maybe not for processing 
the word “apple” or for reasoning about apple market prices.
EmbodIEd coGnItIon and computatIonal modElInG: a 
dIScuSSIon
topIc 1. What qualIfIES aS an “EmbodIEd” computatIonal 
modEl and What arE ItS moSt Important rEquIrEmEntS?
Recent research has shown that grounded, embodied, and situated 
phenomena have a great impact on cognitive processing at all levels 
rather than being confined to the sensory and motor peripher-
ies. In particular, beyond basic response production, intelligent 
action coupled with perception epitomizes embodied approaches. 
This poses significant challenges for computational models in all 
traditions (symbolic, connectionist, etc.). The first and foremost 
challenge is that cognition cannot be studied as a module inde-
pendent from other modules (sensory and motor), as suggested 
by the “cognitive sandwich” metaphor. Instead, cognition is deeply 
interrelated with sensorimotor action and affect. Evidence indi-
cates that even complex cognitive operations such as reasoning 
and language rely on and recruit perceptual and motor brain areas, 
and that imposing interference in these sensorimotor areas signifi-
cantly impairs (or enhances) a person’s ability to execute cognitive 
tasks. Embodiment plausibly exerts its influence also by shaping 
development; thus, complex cognitive operations are learned based 
on simpler sensorimotor skills, which provide a ready neural and 
functional substrate. This implies that cognitive processes cannot 
be divorced from the sensorimotor processes that provided the 
scaffold for their development.
Consider a few examples of embodiment signatures in cogni-
tion. Spatial associations are frequently used to ground abstract 
conceptual knowledge, such as numerical magnitudes. This has 
been documented extensively in the SNARC effect (for a recent 
meta-analytic review, see Wood et al., 2008). Briefly, smaller 
magnitudes are associated with left space and larger magnitudes 
with right space, but this mapping is sensitive to contextual and 
cultural factors. More recently, the manipulation of magnitudes 
(arithmetic) has been shown to be mapped onto space, with addi-
tion inducing right biases and subtraction inducing left biases 
(Pinhas and Fischer, 2008; Knops et al., 2009). Another signifi-
cant example of embodiment signatures in cognition is attention 
deployment, which plays a central role in forming concepts and 
directing reasoning within a grounded cognition framework (Grant 
and Spivey, 2003). In line with the embodied cognition approach, 
bodily constraints impose corresponding constraints on cognitive 
functioning and vice versa. Consider first how body postures affect 
attentional processing. With regard to one’s own postures, attention 
cannot be cued more laterally if the observer’s eyes are already at 
their biomechanical limit (Craighero et al., 2004). Similarly, pre-
shaping one’s hand influences the selection of large or small objects 
in a visual search task (Symes et al., 2008), and planning to either 
point or grasp modulates the space- and object-based deployment 
of attention (Fischer and Hoellen, 2004) as well as the selection 
of object features (Bekkering and Neggers, 2002). With regard to 
perceiving other people’s postures, a large body of work on joint 
attention has discovered behavioral and neural evidence of rapid 
and automatic ability to process another person’s gaze direction 
(Frischen et al., 2007), head orientation (Hietanen, 2002), and 
hand aperture (Fischer et al., 2008) to deploy one’s own attention 
to a likely action goal. Body postures also affect one’s higher-level 
cognition. For example, adopting a particular posture will improve 
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the outputs of multiple maps. However, I don’t see any principled 
criterion for deciding what association areas should be included 
and how should they be organized.
Ernest: This problem is complicated because modalities seem 
to have a hierarchical rather than a flat structure. However, we 
still have an incomplete knowledge of the hierarchical structure 
of feature areas and association areas, and the connectivity pat-
terns among them. Also important are the unique areas associated 
with bottom-up activation versus top-down simulation, along with 
shared areas. Regarding perception, most researchers believe that 
at least one association area or convergence zone is required for 
integrating information from different modalities (Damasio, 1989; 
Simmons and Barsalou, 2003). These ideas offer a starting point 
for computational modeling, which could be useful for answering 
many open questions. One question is whether a single area exists 
in which all types of information are integrated, as proposed by 
Patterson et al. (2007), or whether there are many, possibly hierar-
chically organized convergence zones. This question seems ripe for 
modeling because we have only begun to explore the consequences 
of various configurations in experimental work. For example, is 
more than one association area required to account for patterns 
of conceptual impairment?
Mary: I believe that the computational methodology could 
help in this regard by assessing the computational advantages that 
association areas and hierarchies provide, and assessing their costs 
(in computational terms). In addition, by using computational 
modeling it becomes possible to investigate the factors that regu-
late the patterns of connectivity among modalities. For instance, 
it has been proposed that “far-” senses, such as vision, are often 
predictive of “near-” senses, such as touch (Verschure and Coolen, 
1991), and this would constrain associations and hierarchies. A 
third important issue concerns investigating the relations between 
sensory and motor codes. Indeed, in complete robot architectures, 
not only sensory information, but also motor information, in 
terms of both planning and execution of movements, would be 
required, and an important issue for computational modeling is 
how to integrate them.
Ernest: In cognitive neuroscience and psychology, there is a wide 
interest on how sensory and motor information is integrated in the 
brain. Traditional theories of planning tend to see sensory, cogni-
tive, and motor codes as different; this implies a transduction from 
(modal) sensory to (amodal) cognitive codes, in which the latter 
guides cognitive processing and activates motor codes (Newell and 
Simon, 1972). By contrast, ideomotor theories of action provide 
support for the common coding of action and perception (Prinz, 
1997; Hommel et al., 2001), which requires no transduction and 
could provide a better substrate for computational modeling of 
embodied phenomena. Similar ideas have rapidly gained impor-
tance in (social) cognitive neuroscience, due to the discovery of 
multimodal neurons, such as mirror neurons (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004). Many researchers believe that both perception 
and action rely on a principle of feature binding, whose anatomical 
and functional aspects are only partly understood. At the functional 
level, Körding and Wolpert (2004) proposed that the central nerv-
ous system combines, in a nearly optional fashion, multiple sources 
of information, such as visual, proprioceptive and predicted sensory 
states, to overcome sensory and motor noise. One advantage here 
Ernest: Well, there is a big gap between the visual representation 
of an apple and the kind of reasoning you have in mind. However, 
note that embodied cognition does not claim that the brain is a 
recording system, or that objects are represented as “pictures” in the 
brain. Rather, the key idea is that the format of representations is 
still modal when they are manipulated in reasoning, memory, and 
linguistic tasks. For instance, it is now increasingly recognized that 
linguistic objects are stored as sensorimotor codes (Pulvermüller, 
2005). Since language processing recruits the same circuits as action 
representation and planning (bidirectional) interference effects 
occur that have been observed experimentally. There is increasing 
evidence that the modal nature of representations creates “inter-
ferences” with memory and reasoning tasks as well (see Barsalou, 
2008a for a review). Note also that to implement a truly embod-
ied cognitive system, multiple modalities are essential. In addition 
to sensory and motor modalities, internal modalities, including 
affect, motivation, and reward, are essential from the embodied 
perspective.
Mary: Then, one can ask: what modalities are critical to include 
in a model of grounded cognition?
Ernest: Well, the answer depends, I suppose, on the empirical 
phenomena you want to model and on the specific embodiment 
of the robots you use. In general, however, it seems obvious that an 
embodied model of human cognition has to include the perceptual 
modalities, including, if possible, various aspects of vision, hearing, 
taste, smell, and touch, as all of them are relevant to human cogni-
tion. Note that the different modalities could be organized differ-
ently in the brain, and could contribute differently to action control. 
Excluding task-specific weighting of relevance, it seems important 
to implement visual dominance over the other modalities because 
it has frequently been demonstrated in sensory conflict paradigms, 
as in Calvert et al. (2004), for example. Embodied models of non-
human cognition should also consider that non-human animals 
use multiple modalities as well.
Mary: Implementing multimodality in robots is not simple. 
There are nowadays many robotic platforms in the market; if we 
also consider that some of them can be customized, this offers (at 
least in principle) an ample choice of modalities to be included. 
However, simply including more modalities does not guarantee bet-
ter performance, because an important issue concerns the associa-
tions among them. How should representations of different modalities 
be associated into patterns?
Ernest: In principle, this could be done directly, via connections 
from one modality to another, or indirectly, via association areas 
that function as hubs, linking modalities.
Mary: In computational terms, a simple, but certainly not unique, 
method for implementing direct connections from one modality 
to another is designing robot controllers composed of multiple, 
interlinked modal “maps” [e.g., Kohonen’s (2001) self-organizing 
maps], such as for instance motor maps, visual maps, and auditory 
maps, and see how they become related so as to support cognitive 
processing. For instance, a robot controller composed of multi-
ple maps can learn coordinated motor programs such as looking 
at objects, pointing at objects, hearing their sound, etc., and the 
maps could develop strong associations between object-specific 
(motor, perceptual) features. Association areas can be designed as 
well within the same framework, by introducing maps that group 
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cognition in a fully embodied system. One possibility is that under-
standing and producing abstract concepts, such as love or fear, 
depends on knowledge acquired from introspection (Craig, 2002; 
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
Requirement 2. From sensorimotor experience to cognitive skills: 
abstraction and abstract thought on the top of a modal system
Mary: This leads us to another important topic. Even if we under-
stand how the modalities interact, from a computational viewpoint, 
we do not know how modal representations can support cognitive 
processing, nor the wide range of cognitive tasks embodied theo-
ries can potentially tackle. Is there any theory of how grounded 
representations could do that?
Ernest: One of the most “organic” proposals so far is Barsalou’s 
(1999) idea of simulation. A simulation is “the re-enactment 
of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during 
 experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008a, 
pp. 618–619). The ability to map simulations onto sensorimotor 
states by using overlapping systems is essential, and permits imple-
menting the top-down construal that characterizes all cognitive 
activity. A big challenge for computational modeling is realizing 
simulation mechanisms. This permits testing whether and how 
they can support cognitive operations ranging from memory tasks 
to categorization, action planning and symbolic operations, and 
producing both abstractions and exemplars, both of which are 
central to cognition.
Mary: Then, it seems to me that an embodied cognition picture 
of cognitive processing could be the following (see Figure 1). First, 
grounded models are formed based on situated interaction of the 
robot with its environment (including other robots or humans). 
These symbols are multimodal and link perceptual, motor and 
valence information related to the same learning episodes. Second, 
cognitive processing is performed through the re-enactment of 
grounded symbols: a process that is called “situated simulation.” 
During situated simulation, what becomes active anew includes 
not only the relevant episode-specific representations, but also the 
associated bodily resources and sensorimotor strategies, and so 
cognition operates under the same constraints and situatedness 
of action.
Ernest: This seems to me quite an appropriate blueprint. How 
different is it from standard computational models?
is that neuroscience research is advancing rapidly and continues 
to provide useful information on how to represent and integrate 
these types of information.
Mary: This is indeed a very relevant point for computational 
modeling of embodiment. In traditional AI and vision research, 
internal representations are typically defined as functions of the 
input, and perceptual learning is formulated as the problem of 
extracting useful “features” from passively received perceptual 
(mainly visual) stimuli. Even in robotics, most studies (e.g., using 
reinforcement learning) use fixed sets of representations, which 
define for instance the current location and pose of the robot. Not 
only are these representations predefined (by the programmer), but 
also they are “generic,” or not specifically tied to the motor repertoire 
of the robot. Conversely, researchers in cognitive robotics increas-
ingly recognize that perception and action form a continuum, and 
perceptual learning cannot disregard what is behaviorally relevant 
for the robot (see, e.g., Weiller et al., 2010); or, in other words, that 
representations should be shaped by the motor repertoire of the 
robot rather than being generic descriptions of the external world. 
This has led to a renaissance of the construct of object affordances 
(Gibson, 1979). Yet another formulation of the same idea is that 
learning is not a passive process, but is governed by the properties 
of the learning system. Because robots can actively control their 
inputs by means of their motor commands, their perceptual rep-
resentations become dependent on motor skills and imbued with 
motor information as they explore their environment.
Ernest: Robotics seems to be a good starting place for investigat-
ing the mutual relations among the sensory modalities, and between 
sensory and motor modalities. Going even further in this direction, 
internal representations should be imbued with value representa-
tion, or information from the “internal” modalities, such as affect, 
interoception, motivation, and reward.
Mary: In robotic scenarios, adding internal motivations to robot 
architectures offers a natural way to link actions and value. The 
study of motivational systems is recently re-gaining importance 
in robotic settings (see, e.g., Fellous and Arbib, 2006).
Ernest: This stream of research could have additional advan-
tages. Indeed, not only is value information essential for indicating 
significance to a robot’s actions, but current research in embodied 
cognition is revealing that affect, emotion, and the internal states 
that result from them could play a key role in shaping high-level 
Figure 1 | A grounded cognition perspective on how grounded (modal) symbols are firstly formed based on situated interactions with the external 
environment, and therefore re-enacted as situated simulations that afford higher-level cognitive processing (having the same characteristics and 
constraints as embodied and situated action).
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govern sensorimotor skills, as has been done in traditional compu-
tational modeling of psychological phenomena. This is not to say 
that all concepts originate in experience, given that there could be 
nativist contributions as well, only that the empirical contributions 
to concepts reflect the constraints of actual experience.
Mary: This is a good starting point for a research program in 
embodied computational modeling. However, computer scien-
tists also have to deal with the soundness and feasibility of their 
approach; and unfortunately, from a computational viewpoint, the 
powers and limitations of simulations are still unclear. For instance, 
similar to traditional theories of conceptual representations, simu-
lations could be too rigid to account for the variety of experience. 
If simulations and concepts collect (or perhaps average on) experi-
ence, how do they adapt to novel simulations and how do they get 
framed around background situations?
Ernest: One possible answer to this question is that simulations 
are not expected to replay all collected information; instead, they 
merge with perception to form completely situated experiences and 
can re-enact different content depending on current goals, senso-
rimotor, social, and affective states, all of which make (only) some 
content relevant. In a series of articles, Barsalou (1999, 2008a, 2009) 
presented various arguments and data indicating that simulators 
can be considered dynamical systems that produce simulations in 
a context-specific way that changes continually with experience.
Mary: A second possible limitation of simulations and re- 
enactment is that they seem to be prima facie related to the here-
and-now. Therefore, it is difficult to see how they relate to something 
outside the present situation.
Ernest: According to Barsalou (1999), simulations re-enact 
perceptual experience, and the same neural codes implied in the 
initial experience with the actual objects. However, this does not 
preclude running simulations that represent future states of affairs. 
The re-enactment notion should not be confused with passive rec-
ollection of past states. Many recent studies have highlighted the 
importance of simulating future states of affairs to coordinate with 
the world as it will be, not simply with how it is now, and have 
argued that preparing for future action, not just recalling it, could 
be the main adaptive advantage of re-enactment, simulation, and 
memory systems (Glenberg, 1997; Schacter et al., 2007; Pezzulo, 
2008; Bar, 2009; Barsalou, 2009). The richness and multimodality 
of simulations is useful to produce predictions across domains. A 
study by Altmann and Kamide (1999) shows that subjects started 
to look at edible objects more than inedible objects when listen-
ing to “the boy will eat” but not “the boy will move,” indicating 
that people can combine linguistic and non-linguistic cues to gen-
erate predictions. (Note that here the terminology is somewhat 
ambiguous because sometimes “simulation” is used as a synonym 
of re-enactment and sometimes as a synonym of long-term predic-
tion.). Studies that involve imagination of future states of affairs 
also report that (visual and motor) simulations and imagery share 
neural circuits with actual perceptions and actions (Kosslyn, 1994; 
Jeannerod, 1995) and are subject to the same timing and general 
constraints. For instance, visual images and perception have the 
same metric spatial information and are subject to illusions in the 
same way. Performed and imagined actions respect Fitts’s law of 
motor control and its occasional violations (Eskenazi et al., 2009; 
Radulescu et al., 2010). It has been proposed that detachment from 
Mary: Well, some existing systems, for instance connectionist 
architectures, already encode sensorimotor patterns in some form. 
What is more novel is how sensorimotor patterns are reused, and 
the idea that grounded symbols can be re-enacted so as to produce 
grounded cognitive processes. From a computational viewpoint, 
one interesting aspect of this theory is that a single mechanism, 
simulation, could underlie a wide range of cognitive phenomena. 
However, despite the potentialities of this idea, it raises many feasi-
bility issues, such as how quick and accurate simulations should be 
to be really useful, how many computational resources are required 
to run simulations in real time, and how simulations of different 
aspects of the same situation can merge. Feasibility issues are of 
primary importance for computational modeling; if the idea of 
situated simulation successfully permeates cognitive robotics, a 
lot of effort will be required to bridge the gap between its current 
conceptualization and the full specification of efficient simulated 
mechanisms. In addition, we still have an incomplete picture of 
how simulation works. Even if we have a complete architecture 
provided with multiple modalities, it is still unclear what should 
be re-enacted that constitutes a simulation.
Ernest: As a first approximation, simulations could be automatic 
processes that simply re-enact the content of previously stored per-
ceptual symbols, although there could be deliberate uses of simula-
tions as well.
Mary: This simply shifts the problem from the re-enactment 
to the formation of simulators, and more in general to how the 
different modalities contribute to specific cognitive tasks. Take 
categorization as an example. It is difficult to see how individual 
concepts are extracted from rich multimodal experience, and which 
mechanisms are responsible for their formation. How should these 
mechanisms work in practice?
Ernest: Psychologists and neuroscientists have often focused 
on pattern association in associative areas, which could encode 
increasingly “abstract” concepts. Nevertheless, how (and which) 
patterns are associated and classified is only partly understood. 
One recent idea (Barsalou, 1999) is that categorical representations 
might emerge when attention is focused repeatedly on the same 
kind of thing in the world, by utilizing associative mechanisms 
among modalities, which, in turn, might permit re-enactment 
and simulation when needed. To the best of my knowledge, this 
mechanism has never been tested in computational models and 
would certainly be a valuable contribution to embodied cognition 
research because it would represent the development of alternative 
computational mechanisms.
Mary: This is a very good example of what grounded models 
can offer concerning longstanding questions, like the acquisition of 
abstract concepts and abstract thought. Also, your example high-
lights the “style” of embodied cognitive models compared to tra-
ditional computational modeling. What seems to me to be crucial 
here is that the acquisition of representations and skills is itself an 
embodied and situated process, is grounded in the sensorimotor 
abilities and bodily resources of the learner, and thus is modulated 
by the same environmental and cultural circumstances.
Ernest: You are right. Not only should grounded models refrain 
from using amodal symbols, but also from modeling the acquisition 
and use of concepts and reasoning skills as abstract processes, or 
processes that are not subject to the same constraints and laws that 
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future events, understanding actions executed by others, or as an 
aid to memory. In these cases, expressions such as “taking a per-
spective on a problem” or “putting oneself into another’s shoes” or 
“grasping a concept” have to be taken more literally than normally 
assumed. Overall, due to their coherent learning processes and to 
re-enactment, grounded cognitive processes have the same powers, 
but also the same constraints, as bodily actions.
Mary: I wonder how your examples could be treated in a sound 
cognitive robotics design methodology. Ideally, rather than focusing 
on the abstract nature of cognitive problems, modelers should ask 
first what sensorimotor processes could support them in embodied 
agents. An emblematic example is temporal reasoning via spatial 
skills: a somewhat novel way to approach this topic could be learn-
ing spatial navigation first, and then reasoning in the temporal 
domain on top of the spatial representations, by re-enacting similar 
bodily processes. Clearly, this should be done within an embodied 
and situated research program rather than generically via com-
putational modeling. I am increasingly more inclined to propose 
cognitive robotics as the primary methodology with which this and 
other grounded phenomena could be studied, as it emphasizes the 
importance of sensorimotor processes, situated action, and the role 
of the body. Still, it is unclear to me how realistic the bodies of 
robots should be. What kind of embodiment is necessary to study 
grounded phenomena? Is the specific embodiment of our models 
really important for embodied phenomena to happen? Can we 
study embodied cognition in agents that do not have their own 
“body” (as in general cognitive agents) or that are just computer 
simulations of robots’ bodies?
Ernest: Well, we know that most embodied effects are not only 
due to the way task-related information is represented, re-enacted, 
and processed, but are also due to the fact that the body is the 
medium of all cognitive operations, whether they are as simple as 
situated action or as complex as reasoning. Contrary to traditional 
cognitive theory, researchers in embodied cognition (e.g., Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1999) have argued that the body shapes cognition 
during development and continues to exert an influence at all stages 
of cognitive processing. Embodiment could have subtle and unex-
pected effects on cognitive processing. For instance, Glenberg and 
Kaschak (2002) showed that the action system influences sentence 
comprehension [the action–sentence compatibility (ACE) effect] 
and that subjects needed more time to understand sentences when 
the action required to signal comprehension was in the opposite 
direction than the target sentence (e.g., upward direction when the 
sentence referred to downward actions). From all these considera-
tions, I would say that being realistic about embodiment is a must, at 
least in certain domains. Then, I see the point of your last question: 
a paradoxical consequence of taking embodiment claims literally is 
that cognitive robots could not be good models of human cognition 
because their bodies are too different from the body of humans, 
and have different computational, sensory, memory, and motor 
resources. What are the currently available platforms in cognitive 
robotics, and how well embodied are they?
Mary: Within embodiment research, cognitive models can 
be based on a variety of tools and platforms ranging from gen-
eral cognitive agent systems (including multi-agent systems), 
to robot simulation models, up to physical robot platforms in 
cognitive robotics.
the here-and-now of experience, which, for example, is required for 
planning actions in the future, could be realized as a sophistication 
of the predictive and prospective abilities required in motor control 
and could recruit the same brain areas, rather than being processed 
in segregated brain areas with abstract representations (Pezzulo and 
Castelfranchi, 2007, 2009). This view is supported by the close rela-
tionship between the neural circuits that underlie motor imagery 
and motor preparation (Cisek and Kalaska, 2004).
Mary: Still, we have been talking about non-present circum-
stances related to the senses and the modalities (future or past 
states of affairs). It is even harder to imagine how simulations 
might relate to non-observable circumstances, such as, for example, 
“transcendental” concepts like space and time. How could space 
and time be implemented in a grounded system? And how would 
these implementations allow the system to run simulations of non-
present experience with some fidelity to the representation of space 
and time in actual perception and action? A second issue concerns 
abstract concepts, including how they can support a full-fledged 
symbolic system.
Ernest: Well, these are all difficult questions, and I believe that 
cross-fertilization between empirical research and computa-
tional modeling could contribute to clarifying them. One tenet 
of grounded cognition is that all processes are situated and use 
modality-specific information rather than being processed in an 
abstract, amodal, logical space. This means that the representations 
of space and time in grounded systems, in all their manifestations, 
draw significantly on the processing of space and time in actual 
experience. Perception, cognition, and action must be coupled in 
space and time, and simulations of non-present situations must be 
implemented in space and time, perhaps using overlapping systems. 
Internal simulations do not escape this rule; so if abstract concepts 
and symbolic manipulations are grounded in introspective simula-
tions, they should be sensitive to external space and time, too, and 
retain sensorimotor aspects. Although realizing how to implement 
a full-fledged symbolic system is a complex issue, some ideas useful 
for modelers have been presented. For example, Barsalou (2003) 
argued that selective attention and categorical memory integra-
tion are essential for creating a symbolic system. Once these func-
tions are present, symbolic capabilities can be built upon them, 
including type-token propositions, predication, categorical infer-
ence, conceptual relations, argument binding, productivity, and 
conceptual combination.
Requirement 3. Realistic linkage of cognitive processes with the 
body, the sensory and motor surfaces, the environments in which 
cognition happens, and brain dynamics
Mary: These ideas at least provide some initial direction for creating 
novel grounded architectures and models. However, we have mostly 
discussed the modality of representations: do you think that there 
are additional factors that embodied models should include?
Ernest: According to grounded cognition theories, not only the 
modalities, but also sensorimotor skills and bodily resources influ-
ence cognitive processing, even in abstract domains. For instance, 
visuomotor strategies and eye movements are reused for abstract 
thinking; finger movements can be employed for counting; spa-
tial navigation skills can be reused for reasoning in the temporal 
domain; motor planning processes can be re-enacted for imagining 
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the use of bio-inspired methods for the design of sensorimo-
tor, cognitive, and social capabilities in autonomous robots. 
Robots are required to learn such capabilities (e.g., attention 
and perception, object manipulation, linguistic communica-
tion, social interaction), through interaction with their envi-
ronment, and via incremental developmental stages. Cognitive 
robotics, especially approaches that focus on the modeling 
of developmental stages (aka developmental and epigenetic 
robotics), can be very beneficial in investigating the role of 
embodiment, from the early stages of cognitive development 
to well developed cognitive systems, and to study how bodies 
and cognitive abilities co-evolve and exert significant influen-
ces on one another.
The choice of the most suitable modeling approach from the three 
methodologies listed above depends on the specific aims of the 
research, the availability of resources, and the consideration of the 
technical issues specific to the chosen methodology. For exam-
ple, the first two approaches based on cognitive agents and on 
simulated robot agents are useful when the details of the whole 
embodiment system are not crucial, but rather it is important to 
investigate the role of specific sensorimotor properties in cognitive 
modeling. Moreover, the practical and technical requirements of the 
first two methods are limited as they are mostly based on software 
simulations. Instead, the work with physical robot platforms, as in 
cognitive and developmental robotics, has the important advantage 
of considering the constraints of a whole, integrated embodiment 
architecture. In addition, robotics experiments can demonstrate 
that what has been observed in simulation models can actually be 
extrapolated to real robot platforms. This enhances the potential 
scientific and technological impact of the research, as well as further 
demonstrating the validity of cognitive theories and hypotheses.
Ernest: I see that there is a range of possibilities here. Do you think 
that, to study cognition, the bodies of robots should be the same, or 
very similar to, the bodies of humans or of other animals?
Mary: The kind of embodiment and the constraints that have 
to be taken into consideration depend on what you expect from 
embodied computational modeling. On the one hand, modeling 
can help to find novel ways of understanding phenomena that are 
potentially applicable to cognition in general, such as the idea that 
sensory processing, categorization, and action planning are interde-
pendent rather than separate processing stages. On the other hand, 
if one aims to produce specific predictions about, say, humans, 
then she should aim at replicating the same bodies and the same 
constraints (e.g., environmental and social), or at least a useful 
approximation – which could be difficult to define a priori.
Ernest: One could argue that this is not the whole story, though, 
since there are additional constraints that could be potentially cen-
tral to embodied cognitive modeling, such as brain dynamics and 
their peculiarities and limitations, which are could also be part of 
the robot embodiment in some sense.
Mary: I see your point here. Modeling in general is about find-
ing useful abstractions, but it is difficult to define a priori which 
constraints should be included in embodied computational models, 
and which should not. There is a debate on this topic in the cognitive 
robotics community, with positions that range from defenders of 
biologically constrained methods to the less demanding artificial 
•	 Cognitive agents. Through these models we can typically simu-
late only selected features of the agent’s embodied system. For 
example an agent can have a retina-like visual system, and a 
motor control system to navigate the environment. This is the 
case for models of environment navigation as in foraging tasks. 
Moreover, these models are suitable for multi-agent simula-
tion where we also investigate social and interaction aspects 
of cognitive processing. For example, Cangelosi (2001) imple-
mented a multi-agent model of the evolution of communica-
tion. In it, a population of simulated abstract agents have to 
perform a foraging task. They can perceive the visual proper-
ties of objects (“mushrooms”) that determine their category 
of edible and inedible objects. Moreover, agents have a motor 
system to navigate the 2D world and approach/avoid foods. 
The perceptual and motor systems are implemented through a 
connectionist network, which also includes information rele-
vant to the agent’s basic drives, such as hunger. Through this 
essential modeling of the agent’s sensorimotor system, it has 
been possible to investigate the symbol grounding problem in 
language learning and evolution (see also Cangelosi, 2010).
•	 Simulated robotic agents. These include realistic models of an 
existing robot, such as simulation models of the iCub huma-
noid platform (Tikhanoff et al., 2008), which is an open source 
robotic platform specifically developed for cognitive research, 
and of mobile robots such as khepera (Nolfi and Floreano, 
2000). Moreover, it is possible to build physics-realistic models 
that do not correspond to living systems, such as in studies 
of the evolution of morphology (Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006). 
Typically these simulation models are based on physics engines 
that simulate the physics of object–object interaction dyna-
mics with a high degree of fidelity. Despite the fact that the use 
of a simulation might not provide a full model of the comple-
xity present in the real environment and might not assure fully 
reliable transferability of the controller from the simulation 
environment to the real one, robotic simulations are of great 
interest for cognitive scientists (Ziemke, 2003). For example, 
a simulator for the iCub robot (Metta et al., 2008; Tikhanoff 
et al., 2008) magnifies the value a research group can extract 
from the physical robot by making it more practical to share 
a single robot between several researchers. The fact that the 
simulator is free and open makes it a simple way for people 
interested in the robot to begin learning about its capabilities 
and design, with an easy “upgrade” path to the actual robot 
due to the protocol-level compatibility of the simulator and 
the physical robot. And for those without the means to pur-
chase or build a humanoid robot, such as small laboratories or 
hobbyists, the simulator at least opens a door to participate in 
this area of research.
•	 Physical robot platforms in cognitive robotics. This is for embo-
died models of cognitive capabilities directly implemented 
and tested in the physical platform such as the iCub robot 
(Metta et al., 2008; Macura et al., 2009). Physical robot models 
are important when one wants to study the detailed physics of 
interaction dynamics of specific configurations of sensors and 
actuators. The main field of cognitive modeling relying on phy-
sical robot platforms is that of cognitive robotics (Metta and 
Cangelosi, in press). In particular, cognitive robotics regards 
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architectures that develop their skills over time (see, e.g., Anderson, 
2010). (4) Embodied cognitive modeling should emphasize the 
fact that robots and agents are naturally oriented to action. Other 
abilities (e.g., representation ability, memory ability, categorization 
ability, attention ability) could be in the service of action them-
selves, rather than having disconnected functions (e.g., vision as a 
re-coding of the external world). This latter point would have an 
impact on the traditional conceptualization of cognition as a stage 
in the perception–cognition–action pipeline.
Ernest: I see that all these are important points, and I am sure 
that future research will point out other relevant ingredients as 
well. Concerning the impact that your research could have, I expect 
that if a strong case can be made for the efficacy of embodied 
cognitive models, it would contribute to the success of grounded 
theories in general (as it was the case for the adoption of modal 
representations in cognitive science under the influence of early 
AI systems based on the manipulation of logic rules). So, my 
question is: what is the equivalent of the grounded perspective in 
computational modeling?
Mary: Unfortunately, cognitive modeling does not yet have 
standard, off-the-shelf solutions for implementing grounded 
phenomena, but there are several lines of research that could 
lead to convincing solutions. As a reaction to the conceptual and 
technical limitations of early AI symbolic systems, connectionism 
emphasized that cognition is based on distributed representa-
tions and processing (e.g., statistical processing) rather than on 
the manipulation of amodal symbols and abstract rules. Similarly, 
Bayesian systems showed the full effect of statistical manipulations 
on representations and structures (most of the time, however, this 
has been shown on predefined representations). Although con-
nectionist and Bayesian systems might provide a good starting 
point for modeling grounded phenomena, they are not complete 
answers per se. In most connectionist and Bayesian architectures, 
processing occurs in modular systems separated from the modali-
ties (similar conceptually to a transduction from modal to amodal 
representations), and the processing of cognitive tasks is specialized 
rather than shared with perception and action (similar conceptu-
ally to the manipulation of abstract rules, except that they are not 
explicitly represented but are implicitly encoded in the weights of 
the networks). This means that sensory and motor modalities do 
not affect cognition during processing, even though they can do 
so during development. This would be a weak demonstration of 
grounding and embodiment, showing that sensorimotor and bod-
ily processes are affected by cognition, but not vice versa. Another 
extremely interesting research approach is dynamic systems, which 
emphasize situated action and the importance of a tight coupling 
with the external environment for the realization of all perceptual, 
action, and cognitive phenomena, as well as for their development 
(see, e.g., Thelen and Smith, 1994).
Within dynamic systems and dynamic fields thinking, cog-
nition is mediated by the dynamics of sensorimotor coordina-
tion, and is sensitive to its parameters (e.g., activation level of 
dynamic fields, and their timing), rather than being separated 
from the sensory and motor surfaces. For this reason, dynamic 
systems could be an ideal starting point for modeling grounded 
cognition (Schöner, 2008). In addition, dynamic systems could 
potentially offer explanations that span multiple levels, including 
life approach. Although this is still an open point, it is necessary 
to recognize that, compared to traditional AI methodology that 
focuses on “abstract” or “general” intelligence or problem solvers, 
embodied cognitive modeling suffers more from the idiosyncrasies 
of what is meant to be modeled, be it a human or another living 
organism, because it takes a theoretical stance on the role of the 
“substratum” of cognition and the body.
Ernest: I see another problem of embodied computational mod-
els compared to traditional ones. Indeed, one important aspect of 
embodied models is that they should be coherent at the architec-
tural level; or, in other terms, that their functions should not be 
developed by fully encapsulated models that work in isolation. This 
is especially true for the realization of higher-level cognitive abili-
ties, such as reasoning, language, and categorical thinking, which 
cannot be totally disjoint from the neural systems that, say, direct 
eye movements and attention, regulate posture, or prepare actions 
to be executed.
Mary: This seems to rule out the hybrid approaches that are 
popular in robotics, in which complex cognitive skills are juxta-
posed to basic sensorimotor skills, with a minimal (and prede-
fined) interface. In addition, this poses a challenge to any kind of 
modular design in which functionalities are partly or completely 
encapsulated and do not interact, calling overall for a truly inte-
grative theory. Understanding to what extent modelers can use 
modular design and what functionalities actually interact in any 
given cognitive process is both an important research aim and is 
crucial for the realization of working robotic systems. Indeed, to 
achieve the latter aim, it would be very difficult to simply connect all 
components, but rather the design of their coordination is crucial 
(Barsalou et al., 2007).
Interim conclusion. Novelty of grounded cognitive modeling and 
cognitive robotics
Ernest: We have discussed many important ingredients of embodied 
computational models, but I can easily imagine that some of them 
are already used in computational modeling and robotics. In your 
opinion, what are the most novel elements?
Mary: There are a few points that circulate to some extent in 
the literature, but to which embodied computational modeling 
should give extra emphasis: (1) Representations (grounded modal 
symbols) and cognitive abilities are not “given” but learned through 
sensorimotor interaction and on the top of sensorimotor skills and 
genetically specified abilities. Take as an example spatial abilities. A 
natural way to implement them using early connectionist (PDP) 
models is to encode spatial relations in the input nodes, and them 
let the agent learn navigation on top of them by capturing relevant 
statistics in the input. Rather, in this methodology even spatial rela-
tions should be autonomously acquired. (2) Higher-level cognitive 
abilities (in the individual and social domains) develop on top of 
the architecture for sensorimotor control. The re-enactment of 
modal representations rather than the re-coding in amodal format 
determines them, and they typically reuse existing sensorimotor 
competences in novel, more cognitive domains (e.g., visuomotor 
strategies for the temporal domain; counting with fingers) rather 
than using novel components. (3) Embodied cognitive modeling 
should go beyond isolated models, for example, attention models, 
memory models, and navigation models, to focus on complete 
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that computational modeling could play in developing grounded 
theories of cognition, and how it can complement theoretical and 
empirical research.
Ernest: It seems to me that computational modeling, as a meth-
odology, is highly complementary to empirical research. It can help 
shed light on some aspects of grounded theories that are difficult 
to assess with empirical means only, and in doing so it can help to 
formulate better theories and specific predictions that can be tested 
empirically, and to even falsify current views (or at least lower our 
confidence level) by showing that they are computationally unten-
able. However, prima facie it is different to imagine how designing 
efficacious robots could be a convincing argument for psychologists 
and neuroscientists for or against a certain theory.
Mary: The primary role of embodied cognition models is not 
necessarily that of designing physical robots, such as the iCub, 
that are capable of reproducing human embodiment phenomena, 
although this is also a crucial benefit, as demonstrated by the advan-
tages of biologically inspired systems. Rather, for cognitive scientists 
the robotic and computer simulation models are a way to verify and 
extend their hypotheses and theories. A simulation model can be 
viewed as the implementation of a theory in a computer or robot 
platform. A theory is a set of formal definitions and general asser-
tions that describe and explain a class of phenomena. Examples of 
general cognitive theories are the ones on embodied cognition (as 
discussed in this article) but also other general, and hard to test 
theories such as in language evolution research that hypothesize 
a specific ability as the major factor explaining the origins of lan-
guage (e.g., gestural communication for Armstrong et al., 1995; and 
tool making for Corballis, 2003). Theories expressed as simulations 
possess three characteristics that may be crucial for progress in 
the study of cognition (Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002). First, if one 
expresses one’s theory as a computer program, the theory cannot 
help but be explicit, detailed, consistent, and complete because, 
if it lacks these properties, the theory/program would not run in 
the computer and would not generate results. Second, a theory 
expressed as a computer program helps generate detailed predic-
tions because, as we have said, when the program runs in the com-
puter, the simulation results are the predictions (even predictions 
not thought of by the researcher) for human behavior derived from 
the theory. And finally, computer simulations are not only theories 
but also virtual experimental laboratories. As in a real experimental 
laboratory, a simulation, once constructed, allows the researcher to 
observe phenomena under controlled conditions, to manipulate 
the conditions and variables that control the phenomena, and to 
determine the consequences of these manipulations. Indeed, this is 
one of the main advantages of computational modeling over other 
techniques. Computer simulations answer questions that cannot 
be addressed directly by empirical research; for instance, because 
the addressed phenomena cannot be observed directly or replicated 
(e.g., evolutionary phenomena) or are simply too difficult, risky, 
unethical, or expensive to test in the real world (e.g., the conse-
quences of different learning episodes or model architectures for 
development). In addition, certain empirical phenomena depend 
on systemic and computational constraints on the behaving (or 
cognitive) system, irrespective of whether these constraints are 
posed by the system itself (e.g., bounded resources) or by exter-
nal factors (e.g., situatedness). For instance, in a computational 
brain dynamics,  sensorimotor interactions, and social interaction, 
all using the same language and theoretical constructs. However, 
the full potential of this approach has not been shown yet. First, 
we need increasingly more dynamic systems models of the higher-
level cognitive phenomena that interest psychologists, and which 
provide novel accounts of existing data. An interesting example 
is Thelen et al.’s (2001) model, which offers a novel explanation 
of children’s behavior in the A-not-B paradigm. However, much 
remains to be done in this direction if dynamic systems want 
to become a paradigm for implementing complex operations 
on modal systems. Second, these systems should be increasingly 
embodied, instantiated for instance in robotic architectures, and 
tested in increasingly realistic situated (individual and social) sce-
narios, in order to tell a more complete story about the passage 
from realistic sensorimotor processing to realistic higher-level 
cognitive and social tasks. Third, dynamic systems tend to de-
emphasize (or reformulate) internal representation and related 
notions, which are common currency in psychological and neuro-
scientific explanations, in favor of a novel ontology that includes 
conceptual terms such as “stability,” “synchronization,” “attractor,” 
and “bifurcation.” Besides the adequacy of these ideas, there is 
clearly a more sociological issue, and a new theoretical synthesis is 
required. It is logically possible that the new ontology replaces the 
old one (but then it is necessary that it provides higher explana-
tory power, and this is clearly acknowledged by psychologists and 
neuroscientists), that it re-explains the old one, offering novel and 
potentially more interesting theories of traditional concepts such 
as “representation,” or that the two ontologies can be harmonized 
to some extent, but clearly the foundational aspects of a “dynami-
cist” cognitive science should be clarified before it can really offer 
itself as a novel candidate paradigm (Spivey, 2007). Although I 
have emphasized dynamic systems research, different research 
traditions, including for instance Bayesian approaches and con-
nectionist networks, offer a good starting point for developing 
embodied cognitive models as well, providing that they success-
fully face the same challenges that I outlined before. However, I 
believe that a necessary complement to all these methodologies 
is to increasingly adopt cognitive robotics as their experimental 
platform, rather than designing models of isolated phenomena, or 
relaxing too many constraints about sensorimotor processing and 
embodiment. Indeed, it seems to me that cognitive robotics offer 
a key advantage to the aforementioned methodologies, because it 
emphasizes almost all of the components of grounded models: the 
importance of embodiment, the loop among perceptual, motor 
and cognitive skills, and the mutual dependence of cognition and 
sensorimotor processes.
topIc 2. What can EmbodIEd coGnItIon lEarn from 
computatIonal modElInG and thE SynthEtIc mEthodoloGy?
We have discussed what aspects of grounded cognition theo-
ries should inform computational modeling and the realization 
of robots informed by embodied cognitive abilities. Apart from 
the obvious scientific and technological achievements that these 
robots could provide, we have argued that computational models 
could help to answer open questions in the grounded cognition 
literature, and we have offered a few examples of this potential 
cross-fertilization. Here we focus on methodological issues: the role 
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could be different, so computational models should be endowed 
with precise details and contextual constraints. At the same time, 
it is desirable that common principles emerge, and thus the prom-
ise of computational modeling lies in providing a comprehensive 
framework for explaining interference within cognitive processing 
and reconciling the puzzling findings.
Ernest: You have argued convincingly that cognitive robotics 
could be a good starting point for modeling embodied phenomena, 
but I see a potential drawback in its method: when modeling cogni-
tive functions, we should not forget that the way they are realized 
depends on the way they develop. Indeed, issues associated with 
the architecture’s development and plasticity are important, too, 
including morphological, genetic, experiential, and social contri-
butions, and how epigenesis is realized (Elman et al., 1996). For 
instance, as sensorimotor skills mature over time, cognitive abili-
ties also develop in coordination with the acquisition of action 
skills (Rosenbaum et al., 2001). Also, social factors contribute 
substantially to development. Unfortunately, these dynamics 
are quite problematic to study empirically (but see Thelen and 
Smith, 1994). Again, however, here computational modeling can 
really help, addressing, for instance, the following questions: To 
what extent is a developmental trajectory necessary to “build” a 
grounded system? If it is necessary, what sorts of learning regimens 
are critical, and why?
Mary: This also seems like a nice place for modeling, at least in 
terms of the development or learning of knowledge in some specific 
domains. So, one could investigate whether you need to begin with 
some number of association areas already in place, for example. Or 
possibly this might be an interesting situation for using constructive 
algorithms like cascade correlation (Fahlman and Lebiere, 1990) or 
evolutionary techniques (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000) to see how “hid-
den units,” or convergence zones, develop with experience. Overall, 
I would definitely agree that the dynamics of situated experience 
play an essential role in the shaping of cognitive abilities, and this 
is why I see developmental and epigenetic robotics approaches as 
extremely promising approaches for the construction of grounded 
systems (Weng et al., 2001).
Ernest: Overall, from this discussion I see significant potential 
for collaboration and cross-fertilization between the theoretical, 
empirical, and synthetic methodologies. However, I have recently 
participated in many good conferences, such as SAB, EpiRob, and 
ALife, in which I have seen many computational systems at work. 
Although most scientists in these conferences have similar moti-
vations as you, that is, designing computational models that can 
tell us something about cognition (and in particular higher-level 
cognition), and using similar methods as you describe, including 
cognitive robotics, I am still unsure of what the results are. I don’t 
deny that most of the things that I have seen are inspiring; still I 
fail to see how they can really influence my work. My guess is that 
most current computational models are mere “proofs of concept” 
and lack the adequate level of detail to start deriving precise predic-
tions, or to simply be considered as useful tools by psychologists 
and neuroscientists. To realize the full impact of cognitive mod-
eling on current (and future) theories, one not only has to develop 
computational systems that are generically informed by embodied 
cognition principles, but systems that target specific functionalities 
and experimental data.
study reviewed below, Pezzulo and Calvi (in press) investigated 
what simulators could emerge in a perceptual symbol system due to 
limited resources and other computational constraints.
Ernest: This is indeed interesting, and I see how computational 
modeling could contribute to the development and refinement 
of embodied theories of cognition. For instance, one issue that 
is widely debated is how to interpret the activation of the motor 
system during “cognitive” tasks, such as language understanding; 
or, in other terms, assessing if embodied phenomena are causal or 
epiphenomenal. So far, the most common methodology consists 
of measuring the time course of activation of the brain areas; for 
instance, of motor areas during language perception (Pulvermüller, 
2005). In brief, early activations are more compatible with the view 
that embodied cognition plays a causal role. A more direct approach 
to the understanding of causality consists of interfering with the 
cognitive process, such as in TMS studies, but also with behavioral 
paradigms that create interference between tasks (e.g., a motor and 
a higher-level cognitive task).
Mary: Computational modeling can in principle help to resolve 
the aforementioned debate by providing principled ways to assess 
causality in cognitive processes, or at least provide a “sufficiency 
proof” that certain cognitive tasks, whose functioning is still 
unclear, can be explained on the basis of embodied phenomena. 
For instance, it is possible to compare how competing (epiphe-
nomenal versus causal) computational models explain motor 
involvement during perception of language (Pulvermüller, 2005; 
Garagnani et al., 2007) or affordances (Tucker and Ellis, 2001, see 
later). In “epiphenomenal” models, representations (e.g., linguis-
tic representations) are amodal and their processing is modular 
(i.e., separated from the sensory and action cortices), and when 
the “central” processing affects the “peripheries,” this is an epiphe-
nomenon without causal influence. On the contrary, in “causal” 
models all processing involves simulations and manipulation of 
modal representations. Implementing causal and epiphenomenal 
theories in computational terms, and embodying them into robot 
or agent architectures, can help to disambiguate their explanatory 
power, and to compare their empirical predictions.
Ernest: Another important issue for which computational mod-
els can provide insight is the apparently contradictory evidence on 
facilitatory or inhibitory roles of embodied processes. For instance, 
observation of actions performed by others can either facilitate or 
inhibit one’s own motor actions, depending not only on the degree 
of convergence between the observed and executed actions, but also 
on the time course of the interference, and in some cases on the 
localization of the processing in the brain. The conflicting facilita-
tory versus inhibitory effects in the literature could, for instance, 
reflect the hierarchical nature of perceptual and motor systems, 
with different kinds of effects reflecting different levels in these 
systems, or alternatively, they could depend on the time course of 
the interference. What is lacking is a specific model of when and 
how various processes produce facilitation or inhibition, which 
could serve to test different hypotheses.
Mary: Relative to this issue, computational modeling can imple-
ment competing theories that aim at explaining interference, such 
as theories in which timing or competition for shared resources 
is viewed as the key element for modulating the interaction. Note 
that in different tasks and domains, the mechanisms and the effect 
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topIc 3. currEnt EmbodIEd computatIonal modElS: SuccESSES 
and lImItS
As we have briefly mentioned, there have been many attempts to 
model embodied and situated phenomena, especially in the connec-
tionist and dynamic systems traditions. In these areas, it is widely 
recognized that the body, environment, and internal neural dynam-
ics of agents are highly interconnected and shape one another 
(Clark, 1998; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). However, although these 
models fit the general framework of grounded cognition generi-
cally, most of them do not incorporate its specific predictions. In 
addition, only a few of them explicitly address complex (or even 
moderately complex) cognitive abilities, which are a true “bench-
mark” for grounded theories.
This section discusses a few robotic and agentive systems that 
exemplify current efforts toward the realization of embodied mod-
els of higher-level cognitive abilities, and specifically concepts and 
language understanding. This short review, which is undoubtedly 
biased by the authors’ knowledge, is by no means representative of 
the most successful systems in technological terms, but is intended 
to illustrate current directions toward embodied cognitive models, 
together with their powers and limitations.
Ernest: Two intertwined areas in which embodied cognition 
currently is central are concepts and the expression and compre-
hension of those concepts via language. For example, it seems 
pretty clear at the moment that multiple perceptual modalities 
are intrinsic to object concepts. Lots of experiments and imag-
ing studies suggest this. One clear demonstration of embodied 
cognition for the link between visual and motor processes is 
the stimulus response compatibility effect studied by Ellis and 
colleagues (Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Ellis et al., 2007). They have 
consistently demonstrated that when we perform visual categori-
zation tasks (e.g., identifying artifact versus natural objects), the 
micro-affordances linked to the objects (e.g., power grasp for a 
large apple or precision grip for a small cherry) affect the visual 
categorization task.
Mary: These embodied phenomena have been recently imple-
mented in iCub. Macura et al.’s (2009) model also implements the 
stimulus compatibility effects demonstrated by Tucker and Ellis 
(2001) in a simulation model of iCub (Tikhanoff et al., 2008). The 
experiments focus on training the robot to grasp objects using 
different responses, such as precision versus power grips for small 
and large objects, respectively. They also replicate the psychological 
experiments in which the objects can be categorized using different 
grips (e.g., precision grip for artifacts and power grip for natural 
objects). Specifically, in the simulation experiments there are four 
objects: two larger objects (“big-ball” and “big-cube”) for power 
grips; and two smaller objects (“small-ball” and “small-cube”) for 
precision grips. In this simulation, the round objects (big and small 
balls) are viewed as natural objects, whereas the cubes are viewed 
as artifacts. The training data consist of a set of grasping sequences 
for each object. A connectionist network is used to learn and guide 
the robot’s behavior and to acquire embodied representations of 
objects and actions. The neural architecture, based on the Jordan 
recurrent architecture, has recurrent connections to permit infor-
mation integration and the execution of actions such as grasping. 
The robots successfully learn to handle and categorize the objects 
as per the two tasks.
Mary: This is indeed a necessary step. It is worth noting that 
although we still need a solid methodology for comparing empiri-
cal and synthetic data, various approaches have been proposed 
that compare modeling and empirical data both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. For example, within the literature on computational 
and robotic models of embodiment, there are studies where reac-
tion times collected in psychology experiments have been directly 
compared with other time-related measurements in computational 
agents. Caligiore et al. (2010) directly compare the reaction times 
of Tucker and Ellis’s (2001) stimulus response compatibility experi-
ments with the time steps required by the simulated iCub robot’s 
neural controller to reach a threshold that initiates the motor 
response. In Macura et al. (2009), a more indirect comparison 
for reaction time is used, based on the neural controller’s error 
measurements in the production of the response. In the context of 
neuroscience, specific quantitative methods have been developed to 
compare brain-imaging data from human participants (e.g., from 
fMRI and PET methodologies), with “synthetic brain-imaging” 
data from computational models ranging from computational neu-
roscience models (Horwitz and Tagamets, 1999; Arbib et al., 2000) 
to connectionist models (Cangelosi and Parisi, 2004). The direct 
comparison between empirical and modeling data remains a major 
challenge for multi-agent models of cognition. This is the case for 
evolutionary models (e.g., language evolution models, Cangelosi 
and Parisi, 2002) where only general qualitative comparisons are 
possible due to the lack of data, or due to less realistic implementa-
tion of the sensorimotor and behavioral systems (e.g., multi-agent 
models of foraging). There are, however, other important reasons 
why our ideas fail to permeate cognitive science as a whole. On 
the one hand, there is a clear “sociological” problem of different 
languages and different conferences. On the other hand, there are 
more serious methodological differences that have to be bridged to 
some extent. It is often the case that modelers and empiricists have 
different research questions in mind, or use different lexicons. In 
addition, modelers in the communities that you mentioned tend 
to emphasize complete architectures and the fact that many proc-
esses interact, whereas empirical research often adopts a divide-
and-conquer strategy and tends to study brain and behavior as if 
there were specialized processes, such as memory, attention, and 
language, with specialized neural representations.
Ernest: I would agree that the methodological differences make 
collaboration harder, and then that “empiricists” have to change 
as much as “modelers.” The last point you mentioned is the most 
important one to me. Although you would rarely meet a cognitive 
scientist who claims to be a modularist, still some modularism (and 
localizationism) leaks into experimental paradigms in practice. 
Indeed, there is a tendency to study cognitive processes in isolation, 
as if they had separable neural substrates and encapsulated repre-
sentations, a clear “objective” target that can be readily disconnected 
from the organism’s behavior and goals (e.g., memory is for storage 
and retrieval the maximum number of elements, attention is for 
selecting stimuli), and as if they had specialized resources, inputs, 
and outputs that are clearly separable from those implied in other 
processes that take place at the same time. Overall, an added value 
of collaboration with embodied computational modelers could be 
a push toward integrated theories of cognition rather than theories 
of isolated functions.
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“hears” a word, it can perform the corresponding action. This 
training phase based on the visual demonstration and simulta-
neous naming of actions is called the “direct grounding” phase 
and resembles the way in which children acquire new concepts 
while an adult comments on their actions (Pulvermüller, 2005). 
Subsequently the demonstrator teaches new composite, higher-
order actions solely through language instructions. The dem-
onstrator utters sentences such as “grab is close_left_arm and 
close_right_arm” (no visual demonstration of the grab action is 
given). The learner’s neural network uses a new learning algorithm 
that allows it to transfer the sensorimotor grounding of the basic 
words (“close_left_arm”) to the new linguistic concept of “grab.” 
This is achieved by first (internally) simulating the individual 
actions and by later reusing its own predicted output motor states 
as teaching inputs for the new linguistic concepts. This is an opera-
tional neural network implementation of a mental simulation 
mechanism in perceptual symbol system theory. Through this 
internal (mental) simulation, the imitator agent learns to perform 
and demonstrate the higher-order motor concept of grabbing. 
This training phased is called “grounding transfer.” This model 
is an example of a higher-level (i.e., language-related) cognitive 
model of embodiment theory. A related robotic model, imple-
mented by Madden et al. (2009), uses situated simulation as a 
“middle layer” for connecting propositional representations of 
sentences and the robot’s sensorimotor experience. This system 
permits the temporal unfolding of propositions under the guid-
ance of situated simulations and, at the same time, successfully 
demonstrates grammatical control of aspects of the simulation, 
beginning to tackle the broad issue of language comprehension 
and its neural bases. This approach could shed light on the rela-
tions between simulations and language, and how the linguistic 
system can be used to control simulations.
Other robotics models of language learning, which have a 
direct impact on the embodied literature, are Steels and Kaplan’s 
(2000, 2002) models of the cultural evolution of language. In these 
computational studies, the focus has been on the social interac-
tion between robotics agents that leads to the self-organization of 
shared lexicons.
Another relevant line of research touches on the issue of how 
concepts can be grounded in anticipated action or interaction 
with objects. For example, Moller and Schenck (2008) have stud-
ied how navigation-related concepts such as “far” or “closed path” 
could derive from the internal simulation of robot navigation. 
Interestingly, these concepts are grounded in the robot’s antici-
pated perception, but go far beyond mere perception and include 
action possibilities, suggesting a route toward the development 
of more abstract knowledge. In a similar vein, Roy (2005a) has 
proposed a schema-based robot architecture in which the mean-
ing of words and sentences in natural language are grounded in 
expectations relative to the robot’s sensorimotor flow. For example, 
simple words such as “red” that refer to perceptual features have 
their grounding in expected sensory information in the robot’s 
sensors. Concepts and words that refer to reachable and graspable 
objects are grounded in perceptual and motor schemas and in the 
expectations they produce during action planning and perform-
ance. For instance, the meaning of “sponge” is a set of expected 
action  outcomes (e.g., an anticipated softness).
One important test of this model of object grasping and micro-
affordances is the comparison of the congruent condition (where 
the categorization grip is in agreement with the natural grip) and the 
incongruent ones (where there is mismatch between the categoriza-
tion grip and the natural grip). The trained neural networks were 
presented each object in turn, where the desired target depended 
on the task being performed. The network test error was used as 
an equivalent of the participant’s reaction time performance. Test 
results are highly consistent with psychological experiments where 
categorization latencies are shorter in congruent than in incongru-
ent trials. In addition, the reaction times for larger objects were 
faster than for smaller objects, as was also the case in psychological 
experiments. This indicates that the robot was able to generalize a 
grasping sequence for each task and object from the four grasping 
sequences used in training, hence learning to appropriately grasp 
and categorize objects based on their shapes and sizes.
This computational model of Tucker and Ellis’s (2001) com-
patibility effect demonstrates that it is possible to build robots 
capable of performing object manipulation tasks using the same 
constraints and mechanisms observed in human embodied cogni-
tion. Moreover, related models of microaffordance effects have been 
developed using a neurally plausible organization of the robot’s 
neural architecture (Caligiore et al., 2010), with an extension of this 
model to simulate other compatibility effects, such as those studied 
by Borghi et al. (2004), which are also language-related.
Ernest: This is indeed very interesting, and I am curious to see 
how these studies evolve toward a comprehensive design meth-
odology. However, most scientists, even those not convinced by 
embodied theories might admit that certain concepts, and espe-
cially concepts for manipulable objects, are partially represented 
in motor terms, and might recruit the motor system (even if they 
would not admit that motor processes are necessary for their under-
standing). What is definitely less clear is how you might model 
abstract concepts, such as objects that have no clear reference to 
observable or manipulable entities, or concepts that seem to be 
essentially “linguistic.” How might we do this?
Mary: Currently, there are few embodied models of cognition 
that address the issue of how to develop concepts that depart 
from the most immediate sensations and actions, and grounded 
processes for their manipulation. One important line of research 
touches on the issue of how language and the conceptual system 
interact. Cangelosi and Riga (2006) present a simulated robotic 
agent model of the combination of sensorimotor categories, paired 
with language learning, to autonomously generate new action 
concepts. This is achieved through a connectionist implementa-
tion of the mental simulations in Barsalou’s perceptual symbol 
system. The model is based on two humanoid robotic agents: 
the demonstrator and the imitator. The demonstrator (teacher) 
shows the correct performance of basic motor primitives (e.g., 
close the left arm, go forward, etc.) and also names the actions 
being demonstrated. The researcher programs this robot to per-
form these basic actions. The second agent, the imitator (learner), 
learns the actions by imitating the demonstrator’s behavior. This 
agent is equipped with an artificial neural network that can learn 
to perform the basic actions by predicting the demonstrator’s 
movement trajectories. The robot’s neural controller also learns 
the words associated with the actions, so that when the imitator 
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abilities. In the remainder of the article, we discuss the most impor-
tant challenges for future research in embodied computational 
modeling, and offer a few views on how to tackle them.
challEnGE 1. takInG a dEvElopmEntal vIEWpoInt to ExplorE 
Why and hoW EmbodIEd coGnItIon could havE orIGInatEd
From an engineering standpoint, the smart way to build an intel-
ligent organism would be to use a modular linear-systems approach 
to learn sensorimotor regularities to the greatest possible extent, 
and then to perform exhaustive computations on that input until 
a single optimal motor action could be selected and executed. The 
“motor babbling” of infants could be seen as supporting such a 
mechanism. Under such a rubric, one should restrict the motor sys-
tem to generating and executing movement plans only for actions 
that have been confidently chosen as the appropriate effector output 
given the array of sensor inputs. In such a scenario, the motor-
movement module is essentially a patient tele-operations system 
enslaved to the finalized commands of the cognition module, an 
approach that dominates the cognitive study of human motor 
control today.
However, the primate nervous system was not engineered by 
designers with such a linear-systems bias. Instead it evolved over 
millions of years, from quite different ancestors, through varying 
environmental niches, with substantial non-linear co-evolution 
among its many subsystems. The result is that the functional neu-
roanatomy of the human brain shares none of the feed-forward 
reasoning that makes a computer circuit-board understandable 
to an engineer. The human cerebral cortex is rife with top-down 
feedback projections and lateral connections that quickly scuttle 
a purely linear-systems analysis (see Carandini et al., 2005, for 
review). For example the orbito-frontal cortex, which is one of 
many sensory-integration regions in frontal cortex, has a direct 
functional projection back to visual cortex (Kveraga et al., 2007). 
This may allow expectations from multiple sensory sources to pre-
pare visual cortex to process its afferent input in a richly contextual-
ized manner (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999).
Not only does feedback cause problems for a modular account 
of cognition, but the continuous flow of information among brain 
areas tends to blur the boundary that one might wish to daw 
between cognition and action. In other words, embodied cognition 
may be unavoidable given the dynamics of the brain, which was not 
designed as a whole, but underwent a complex evolutionary history 
in which successive adaptive solutions (to the same evolutionary 
problems) were implemented by adding on to earlier ones.
Evidence that the motor system is not in fact a “patient and 
obedient slave” that blindly follows the cognition system’s finalized 
commands comes from a variety of studies that measure continu-
ous motor output and multi-cell recording in premotor cortex. 
For example, Cisek and Kalaska (2005) report partial activation 
of two non-overlapping population codes in premotor cortex 
when the monkey is considering two possible reaching destina-
tions. When Gold and Shadlen (2000) presented motion stimuli 
to a monkey and induced an eye movement via micro-stimulation 
of the frontal eye fields, the response-based eye movement (with 
which the monkey indicated the direction of perceived motion) 
and the micro-stimulated eye movement tended to average together 
into a single saccade that (with varying stimulus exposure times) 
Finally, the emergence of grounded categories for motivation-
related concepts such as “prey” and “predator” has been studied 
by adopting a simulated robotic agent methodology (Pezzulo and 
Calvi, in press). The computational architecture first learns multiple 
perceptual symbols in the form of action schemas that couple per-
ception of the entities’ features and action patterns that are more 
useful in the presence of the entities, such as escape or approach. 
Successively, as the agent interacts with the entities in its environ-
ment and learns to adaptively find food and escape from predators, 
associations are created within the perceptual symbols and between 
the perceptual symbols and the agent’s internal motivational states, 
namely hunger and fear. In this way, entire simulators develop that 
cluster (or categorize) external entities and events in terms of the 
integration of possible associated perceptual events, actions, and 
motivational value for the agent, and which form reusable “situ-
ated conceptualizations.” Pezzulo and Calvi (in press) observed that 
many simulators emerge and become encoded within the architec-
ture’s associative links. On the one hand, simulators cluster entities 
that have similar perceptual appearance or behavior; on the other 
hand, two more simulators emerge that correspond to the two 
families of “preys” and “predators,” and determine highly coherent 
motivational dynamics (related to hunger and fear, respectively). 
Importantly, the simulators are not (only) memory structures, but 
support simulations and the dynamic reactivation of perceptual 
symbols (Barsalou, 1999). Simulators, with all their associated 
perceptual symbols, are acquired (partially or in their entirety) 
even from partial observations of salient events, or from changes 
in the agent’s motivational state. In other words, when formed, 
simulators become tuned to types and not only tokens (and the 
exemplars which they were originally developed), simultaneously 
providing abstraction abilities and graded effects. This occurs 
because, depending on the circumstances, perceptual symbols in 
the simulators can be re-enacted to different degrees, or for different 
periods of time. For this reason, they can be considered categories 
that are grounded in the agent’s sensorimotor and motivational 
repertoire. In addition, the study shows that the development 
of simulators produces an increase in the agent’s adaptivity and 
 performance rate.
All these are examples of recent efforts in the modeling of 
embodied phenomena. However, many of them can be consid-
ered preliminary investigations that do not derive precise predic-
tions, but instead explore possible, novel ways to conceptualize 
and model cognitive phenomena, which are broadly inspired by 
embodied cognition research, but have not yet reached the level 
of detail that is required for a fruitful dialog with the empirical 
sciences. In addition, up to now most cognitive abilities, including 
for instance reasoning and memory abilities, and the realization 
of a full-fledged symbolic system, have not been addressed. In the 
rest of the article we discuss these and other related challenges for 
embodied computational modeling, and suggest promising direc-
tions of research.
EmbodIEd computatIonal modElInG: challEnGES for 
futurE rESEarch
We have argued that embodied cognitive theories and computa-
tional modeling are complementary, and we have briefly described 
a few implemented systems that begin to show embodied c ognitive 
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Overall, a first significant challenge for cognitive robotics 
research consists in studying the development of embodied cogni-
tion and how sensorimotor information interfaces with cognition. 
In other words, a possible lesson for cognitive robotics research 
is to pay attention to how an ability could have been developed, 
and not only to its end state. Developmental studies have played 
an important role in forming our understanding or a continuity 
of sensorimotor action and cognition (e.g., the dynamical system 
perspective of Thelen and Smith, 1994; see also von Hofsten, 2004). 
Cognitive robotics can contribute by systematically manipulating 
a robot’s knowledge and skills, in order to understand what are the 
necessary prerequisites for the development of a particular cog-
nitive ability, and by studying the environmental conditions that 
facilitate or prevent cognitive development.
challEnGE 2. ExplorInG thE (cauSal) InfluEncE of EmbodIEd 
phEnomEna for coGnItIvE procESSES
As suggested in the previous section, cognitive processes appear to 
“leak” into the motor system. Therefore, it appears that the very 
reason we can measure cognitive processes via nearly continuous 
dense-sampling recordings of motor movement (e.g., eye move-
ments, reaching movements, bimanual rhythmic movements, pos-
tural sway) originates from the fact that the neural subsystems 
implementing those cognitive processes cannot help but “leak” 
their patterns of neural activation continuously into the various 
motor subsystems. That is, the very fact that we can learn about 
cognition by recording continuous motor output strongly implies 
that cognition is embodied. When those neural subsystems are 
dynamically coupled, a signal arising in one of them routinely is 
detectable as a signal in the other. Importantly for computational 
implementations of embodied cognition, this should be expected 
to happen in both directions – otherwise embodied phenomena 
would have no causal impact on cognitive processing.
Bidirectional synaptic pathways are the rule in cortex 
(Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992), and unidirectional projections 
between cortical areas are quite rare. Therefore, from a neuro-
physiological standpoint, it would seem unlikely that cognitive 
subsystems (in frontal cortex) could “leak” their patterns of neural 
activation out to sensory subsystems (in occipital and temporal 
cortices) and motor subsystems (in frontoparietal areas), but not 
the inverse. However, in formulating a defense for the amodal 
symbolic cognition framework, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) 
have proposed exactly that. To their credit, they acknowledge the 
preponderance of existing laboratory evidence supporting the 
spreading of activation from cognitive processes to sensory and 
motor processes. They propose an account in which cognition itself 
may be “disembodied” in the traditional sense that it conducts its 
business via amodal rules and abstract symbols (unlike percep-
tion and action), and the activation of those symbols then spreads 
to sensorimotor areas to produce the kind of results found in 
much of embodied cognition research. If the directionality of that 
spreading activation is such that the symbolic processes modulate 
sensorimotor processes, but not vice versa, then computations 
within the cognition module would not be influenced by whether 
or not those connections to sensorimotor processes existed (see 
also Pylyshyn, 1974). Adhering to that unidirectional influence 
is crucial in Mahon and Caramazza’s (2008) proposal because if 
revealed the gradual accrual of sensory information apparent in 
neural activity in the frontal eye fields. That is, neurons in the frontal 
eye fields (an oculomotor region in frontal cortex) were accumulat-
ing partial information about the perceptual process before it had 
been allowed to reach completion. Similarly, eye movements in 
humans often “jump the gun” and fixate objects that correspond 
to partially active representations that in the end play no role in 
the person’s planned action (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Allopenna 
et al., 1998). Likewise, reaching movements will systematically 
curve toward multiple potential targets during the course of the 
reach (Tipper et al., 1997; Spivey et al., 2005; Song and Nakayama, 
2009). Even repetitive bimanual rhythmic coordination can show 
effects, in its relative phase dynamics, of changes in a cognitive 
process “leaking” into the motor system (Shockley and Turvey, 
2005). Furthermore, when two people are conversing, their motor 
systems can become entrained with one another, such that their 
postural sway becomes coordinated (Shockley et al., 2003), and 
their eye movements become coordinated (Richardson and Dale, 
2005). These rich interactions among multiple sensory and motor 
subsystems in the brain are especially robust in children (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992), and may even lead to a child’s early formation of con-
cepts being undergirded by sensorimotor representations (Mandler, 
1992; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
The architectural and developmental perspective points to a 
possible roadmap for studying embodied cognition through epige-
netic, evolutionary, or developmental robotics. One could investi-
gate whether organisms provided with simple sensorimotor circuits 
(Braitenberg, 1984) develop behavioral strategies for facing their 
adaptive problems (e.g., discriminating good from poisonous food) 
that can be considered precursors of cognitive abilities (e.g., cat-
egorization abilities). Importantly, one could also examine whether 
these cognitive abilities maintain vestigial (embodied) aspects of the 
earlier sensorimotor skills. The literature on evolutionary robotics 
offers examples of how flexible abilities (e.g., categorization abili-
ties) can be developed, which have always been studied under the 
rubric of cognitive processing and without reference to behavior, 
and that rely on behavioral strategies only, without rich internal 
representations. For instance, Nolfi (2005; see also Beer, 2003) has 
studied how robots equipped with simple sensors can learn to dis-
criminate circles from squares without any memory mechanism, 
by simply moving toward the most informative points so as to 
produce a different sensory flow for each shape. Such studies offer 
an “intuition pump” and a fresh view of how behavioral strategies 
could actually implement basic forms of cognition, suggesting that 
they could be reused (at least partially) even in more sophisti-
cated ones – thus making the case that evolution constrained our 
higher-level cognitive abilities to be embodied. Less studied in this 
literature is, in general, an analysis of how increasingly complex 
abilities (e.g., human-level) could have developed on the basis of 
their putative evolutionary precursors.
A related line of research is the attempt to find basic (compu-
tational and neural) mechanisms that could have facilitated the 
development of cognitive abilities. For instance, some researchers 
have made the case that prediction abilities, originally developed 
for the sake of action control, could have bootstrapped higher-
level cognitive and social abilities and prospection (Pezzulo and 
Castelfranchi, 2007, 2009; Moller and Schenck, 2008).
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algorithms for word reading, speech recognition, object recogni-
tion, and even problem-solving, all incorporate information from 
motor algorithms when producing their results.
Because these directionality effects, and their time courses, add 
further nuance and structure to the embodied cognition literature, 
it becomes especially important for theories of embodied cognition 
to be computationally implemented in order to make quantitative 
predictions of laboratory results explicit, and to study rigorously 
what is the role of perceptual and motor processes in cognitive tasks 
by comparing systems that include or exclude them (for instance, 
simulating lesions or “virtual lesions” such as TMS). If we are to 
understand embodied cognition as a natural consequence of rich 
and continuous recurrent interactions among neural subsystems, 
then building interactivity into models of cognition should have 
embodiment fall out of the simulation naturally. A number of 
neural network models (Howell et al., 2005; Mayberry et al., 2009; 
Anderson et al., 2010), computational simulations (Joyce et al., 
2003; Scheutz et al., 2004; Cangelosi and Riga, 2006; Pezzulo and 
Calvi, in press) and robots (Brooks and Stein, 1994; Roy, 2005b) 
have begun to implement such simulations of embodied cognition, 
and further research along these lines is required.
challEnGE 3. SpEcIfyInG thE tImE courSE of actIvatIon for 
EmbodIEd concEptS
We have discussed that processing models of embodied cognitive 
phenomena are needed at this stage. A key issue for assessing the 
suitability of such models is their ability to explain the unfolding 
in time of cognitive processes, and how they relate to the timing 
of motor and perceptual processes in the brain. Indeed, assessing 
the time course of activation of motor processes during cognitive 
tasks is key to arguments regarding their causal role. Take as an 
example the processing of language. Embodied language process-
ing (both comprehension and production) has now been studied 
in a number of ways, covering neuroscientific as well as behavio-
ral approaches. Several empirical findings constrain the temporal 
dynamics of embodiment processes and should thus also advise 
their computational modeling. One well-known finding is the rapid 
and somatotopic activation of motor- and premotor cortical areas 
while passively viewing action verbs (Pulvermüller, 2005). This 
finding suggests that the meaning of words is available as early as 
150 ms after visual stimulus onset, a result that has been corrobo-
rated by electrophysiological evidence (Sereno et al., 1998; Sereno 
and Rayner, 2003). More importantly, it means that a body-specific 
representation of word meaning has been created within such a 
short time that it is unlikely that strategic factors will have con-
tributed to the effect. How does a computational architecture for 
language comprehension include access to bodily representations? 
Moreover, how does the comprehension process in turn affect the 
use of motor structures, as is suggested by the kinematic recordings 
of Boulenger et al. (2006)? These authors found that action verb 
meaning selectively interferes with action execution within 200 ms 
of action onset, but only when the action is initiated prior to lexical 
processing. When lexical processing precedes motor activity, the 
effect is facilitatory. In a similar vein, the incremental reading work 
by Zwaan and Taylor (2006) suggests that there is an immediate 
but time-limited activation of motor congruency effects that can be 
expressed in faster knob turning when reading about a directionally 
sensorimotor processes can directly influence the algorithms being 
used in the symbolic processes, then those symbolic processes 
would not be purely amodal and abstract.
Mahon and Caramazza’s (2008) argument is a powerful one 
because most of the evidence for embodied cognition can fit nicely 
into their spreading activation account, which preserves a role for 
purely abstract symbolic processing at some level. However, evi-
dence for the other direction of influence, which compromises the 
purity of abstract symbolic processing, is beginning to accumulate 
(reviewed in Barsalou et al., 2003).
More embodiment experiments need to explore this directional-
ity of effect: sensory and motor perturbations influencing central 
cognitive processes. Studies that show an early influence of percep-
tual and motor processes on cognition (see later on timing issues), 
as well as studies that suggest causality (e.g., TMS studies) are 
particularly relevant because these are difficult to explain as a by-
product of a spreading activation and reverberation phenomenon. 
For example, Pulvermüller (1999) reported a collection of neuroim-
aging findings demonstrating that comprehension of action-based 
language triggers activation not only of language areas of the brain 
but also of limb-appropriate areas of motor cortex. Those find-
ings epitomize the typical directionality of effect in embodiment 
studies. To show the reverse, Pulvermüller et al. (2005) conducted 
a transcranial magnetic stimulation study showing that mild TMS 
potentiation of the leg region of motor cortex improved reaction 
times to leg-action words (compared to arm-action words) in a 
lexical decision task (see also D’Ausilio et al., 2009). Behavioral 
studies have demonstrated this type of phenomena as well. After 
Richardson et al. (2003) showed that the image-schematic ori-
entation of certain verbs influences visual attention in an object 
discrimination task, Toskos et al. (2004) showed that a controlled 
regime of repeated horizontal or vertical eye movements influenced 
memory for the (vertical or horizontal) verbs that were heard dur-
ing those eye movements. In an elegant pair of studies, Meteyard 
et al. (2007) first showed that hearing directional motion verbs 
influenced d-prime in a motion detection task, and then Meteyard 
et al. (2008) showed that watching subtle visual motion signals 
influenced reaction times to directional verbs in a lexical decision 
task. Finally, one of the few examples of embodiment influenc-
ing high-level cognitive reasoning comes from a problem-solving 
experiment where the burgeoning onset of insight into the solution 
(the Aha! moment) for a difficult diagrammatic problem was cor-
related with a particular pattern of spontaneous eye movements 
which seemed to “participate” in the generation of the solution 
(Grant and Spivey, 2003). Thomas and Lleras (2007) then used the 
same problem and diagram, but enforced that particular pattern of 
eye movements as a secondary task, and participants were suddenly 
able to discover the solution with a significantly higher frequency. 
Both Smith (2005) and Ross et al. (2007) showed that repeated 
pairing of objects with actions influences their cognitive representa-
tion, as measured with a stronger congruency effect in object clas-
sification after training compared to before training. This reverse 
directionality of motor processes influencing cognitive processes 
is not merely another instance of Mahon and Caramazza’s (2008) 
spreading activation idea. It shows that those cognitive processes do 
not “go about their business” the same way they always would have 
irrespective of the motor constraints. It shows that the cognitive 
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world and achieve goals? What specific computational mechanisms 
underlie top-down construals of the world that are mapped into 
online bottom-up sensorimotor experience, producing the fusions 
that characterize experience? To what extent are these operations 
implemented explicitly in the system versus emerging implicitly? 
Preliminary empirical evidence for these accounts of symbolic 
operations are reviewed in Barsalou (2008b).
As already remarked, symbolic processing is often considered to 
be highly related to abstraction on the one hand, and to language 
on the other hand. This leads to five additional important ques-
tions. How are abstract concepts represented and processed in a 
grounded system? What roles do they play in a grounded system? 
What is the role of language in learning and using them? To what 
extent should language or other communicative mechanisms be 
included in a grounded system? Should robotics researchers cur-
rently try to build a human (with language) or a non-human (with 
simple communication)? Recent research on language development 
and communication in robotics (reviewed above) has begun to 
elucidate these topics, but there clearly exist numerous avenues 
for future research.
challEnGE 5. rEalIzInG SItuatEd and complEtE archItEcturES 
WIthout loSInG contact WIth data
One could ask what specific scenarios should be studied to cause 
embodied cognitive modeling research to advance most rapidly. On 
the one hand, if one aims to replicate specific experimental results, 
the scenario studied is constrained by the original experimental 
set-up. On the other hand, building many micro-simulations, one 
for each task to be modeled, could lead to a proliferation of discon-
nected models. Therefore, it would be equally valuable to create 
“unified” scenarios, or scenarios that could support the modeling 
and testing of many embodied phenomena. To do so, it is neces-
sary to review critically what are the most important (and general) 
characteristics of environments, embodiment, and tasks that could 
be included.
Because (goal-directed) situated action in the environment is 
fundamental for all organisms, implementing embodied cognition 
that supports intelligent activity in a few critical situations (e.g., 
related to the organism’s life and death) may be a good place to 
start (Robbins and Aydede, 2008). This viewpoint is not novel, as 
most recent research in artificial cognitive systems has focused on 
the realization of situated agents, or agents that dwell in complex 
environments (however, simplified with respect to the real environ-
ment), and must “close the loop” from (real) perception to (real) 
action so as to satisfy their internal needs and motivations (which, 
in most cases, are quite simplified as well). This set-up is beneficial 
for embodied cognitive modeling for many reasons. First, it forces 
modelers to build complete embodied architectures for achieving 
goals in specific situations rather than implementing specific capa-
bilities, such as goal setting, planning, perception, action, cognition, 
affect, reward, and learning. This permits us to study how percep-
tual, motor, affective, and cognitive abilities interact effectively, and 
how advanced abilities can emerge from the coordination of sim-
pler ones (Barsalou et al., 2007). Indeed, because a central point of 
embodiment concerns the interactions among, and integration of, 
these systems, building larger scale models appears to be necessary. 
Second, in their attempt to build situated agents, modelers have 
corresponding action. Interestingly, this congruency effect can then 
be re-instantiated when referring back to the described action with 
an adjective (Taylor and Zwaan, 2008).
The time course of embodiment effects is also of interest as an 
internal validation of the embodied cognition view of conceptual 
representation. One would expect that concrete concepts that have 
had a more direct grounding in sensorimotor experiences should 
show more rapid embodiment signatures when compared to more 
abstract concepts which require metaphorical mapping and indirect 
grounding. But even when controlling for word frequency, this 
comparison may be flawed, due to the differential age of acquisi-
tion which favors concrete words. In addition, as we have already 
remarked, timing issues could be critical for explaining apparently 
contradictory findings on the interference (facilitation or inhibi-
tion) of embodied processes.
In summary, there is now a detailed body of work on the time 
course of activation of concepts. What is needed now are integrative 
models that make specific predictions regarding the time course of 
embodied cognitive processes. One example is Chersi et al. (2010) 
who studied the precise dynamics underling the relation between 
language and action. Their model predicts interference or facilita-
tion effects across linguistic and action tasks as depending on the 
time course of activation of associated representations.
challEnGE 4. dEvElopInG EmbodIEd computatIonal modElS of 
SymbolIc and lInGuIStIc opEratIonS
It is a common view that a true “benchmark” for embodied theories 
of cognition is explaining symbolic operations, which have been 
the province of amodal theories since the beginning of cognitive 
science (with few exceptions). This is certainly a difficult chal-
lenge for computational models as well; AI systems have tackled 
symbolic operations from the very beginning, but with little suc-
cess. The wide domain of symbolic manipulations, which loosely 
includes reasoning and abstract thinking, predication, conceptual 
combination, language and communication, and which is typical 
of humans and possibly few other species, is both a challenge and a 
huge opportunity. Could embodied cognition be the right route for 
explaining computational symbolic processing? And, at the same 
time, could computational modeling provide strong evidence in 
favor of embodied cognitive theories? Our introductory examples 
of embodied arithmetic suggest a positive answer.
However, developing embodied approaches to symbolic opera-
tions requires a rethinking of most of the basic assumptions of tra-
ditional symbolic processing, in which symbols were taken as input, 
represented and outputted as symbols (with the notable exception 
of a few connectionist models). Indeed, it is still unclear how, from 
an embodied perspective, basic symbolic operations should be 
implemented. Barsalou’s (1999, 2003, 2005) articles make the case 
that perceptual symbols can implement symbolic (or symbolic-
like) operations, and provide initial thoughts on how this could be 
possible, but there are still many open questions, as the following 
examples attest. What specific computational mechanisms underlie 
the type-token propositions that result from categorization? What 
specific computational mechanisms produce the basic inferences 
that follow from categorization and produce anticipation? What 
specific computational mechanisms integrate and combine con-
cepts into larger conceptual structures as needed to comprehend the 
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and language learning discussed above (e.g., Cangelosi and Riga, 
2006), provide a computational framework for investigating the 
embodiment and situated cognition phenomena of language and 
communication. The double function of language, as a social/
communicative means, and as an individual/cognitive capability, 
derives from its fundamental property that allows us to internally 
re-represent the world we live in. This is possible through the 
mechanism of symbol grounding, that is, the ability to associate 
entities and states in the external and internal world with internal 
categorical representations. The symbol grounding mechanism, 
as our language, has both an individual and a social component 
(Cangelosi, 2006). The individual component, called “Physical 
Symbol Grounding,” refers to the ability of each individual to 
create an intrinsic link between world entities and internal cat-
egorical representations. The social component, called “Social 
Symbol Grounding,” refers to collective negotiation for the selec-
tion of shared symbols (words) and their grounded meanings. The 
extensive evidence on the mirror neuron system in both individual 
and social cognition provides support for the hypothesis of a link 
between the social (e.g., imitation) components of action produc-
tion/recognition and language and communication (Rizzolatti 
and Arbib, 1998). This hypothesis can be computationally inves-
tigated through social and cognitive robotics experiments, as in 
Tani et al.’s (2004) model of mirror neuron system in language 
learning. (The modeling of mirror neurons has attracted a lot 
of attention in the last years; we refer the reader to Oztop et al., 
2006 for a detailed review).
Overall, robotic studies of interactive, social, linguistic, and 
cultural dynamics, along with their interrelations, are particularly 
important for the extension of current embodied theories, which 
have not sufficiently incorporated these aspects, instead mostly 
focusing on individual cognition. One reason for this lack of atten-
tion is that all these dynamics are extremely difficult and expensive 
to study experimentally. Here the synthetic methodology offers a 
significant contribution because it involves many fewer constraints 
than empirical studies with living organisms. To make this cross-
fertilization possible, however, it is desirable to design social robotic 
studies that incorporate increasingly more complex social dynamics 
(imitation, cooperation, joint action, and possibly the dynamics 
of whole societies of agents) and aim to reproduce social ground-
ing and symbolic learning phenomena. A competing constraint is 
that it is necessary for these studies to make explicit and testable 
predictions, which is rare at this time.
concluSIon
Embodied effects have been consistently found in many cognitive 
tasks, including, for instance, action and object observation, mem-
ory, and language processing. Comprehensive theories that advo-
cate the importance of grounding, embodiment, and situatedness 
have been proposed to explain these findings, which are corrobo-
rated by empirical data, but in most cases lack a precise computa-
tional or mathematical formalization. Computational modeling 
of embodied phenomena could contribute to the development of 
embodied theories of cognition by having the same kind of impact 
that early AI concepts (such as symbols, plans, or chunking) had on 
early theories in cognitive science. In addition, compared to early 
AI studies, embodied computational models have the potential to 
widely recognized that the ways in which agents interact with their 
environments profoundly modify their representations and cogni-
tive abilities, and that indeed agents cannot be studied in complete 
isolation from the environments in which they acquire their skills, 
and without including realistic details of their embodiment. Thus, 
this approach points quite directly toward grounded and embodied 
approaches to cognition.
However, if, on the one hand, generality of scenarios is desir-
able, this procedure comes at the risk of losing contact with human 
and animal data. Indeed most models developed under the hat 
of “situated cognition” (or artificial life, or AI) are indeed only 
loosely related to what is currently known about animal cognition. 
In addition, the scenarios that are currently employed in artificial 
cognitive systems research are more related to the basic survival of 
the organisms, but make it difficult to tackle higher-level cognitive 
abilities. One challenge for future research in embodied cognitive 
modeling is the realization of design principles (for architectures, 
scenarios, and embodiment) that are general enough to study many 
phenomena, but at the same time are specific enough to avoid losing 
contact with data and animal or human experiments.
challEnGE 6. rEalIzInG rEalIStIc SocIal ScEnarIoS for 
StudyInG collaboratIvE, compEtItIvE, communIcatIon, and 
cultural abIlItIES
In the previous section, we focused on the realization of (possibly 
complete) goal-directed agent architectures. On the other hand, 
the realization of social scenarios, which involve human–robot 
interactions or coordinated interaction of multi-agent teams, is 
important as well. Although most theories of embodied cognition 
tend to more strongly emphasize the individual than the social 
aspects of cognition, they are not at odds with acknowledging the 
essentially social nature of learning and life of most animal species 
(including, of course, humans), and on the cultural origin of their 
representations and behaviors.
A popular research field in robotics and human–robot interac-
tion concerns imitation, mindreading, intersubjectivity, and tool 
use, with an emphasis on their reliance on subpersonal processes 
such as prediction and mental simulation, and their sensorimotor 
roots (Demiris and Khadhouri, 2005; Oztop et al., 2005; Arbib 
et al., 2009). Other studies have focused on the affective dimension 
of human–robot interaction (Breazeal, 2003), and could provide 
interesting insights for embodied cognition research, in which this 
topic is seldom studied.
Unfortunately, although social and cultural robotics are being 
increasingly studied (Breazeal, 2004), it is difficult to combine 
social, cultural, and embodied aspects in the same endeavor. 
However, this is potentially very interesting for embodied cog-
nition research, since it enables testing the relative importance 
of embodied and social (or cultural) phenomena in shaping 
learning and behavior. For instance, one of the promises of the 
research program of Steels and Kaplan (2000, 2002) is providing 
insights on how embodiment and situatedness could have con-
strained language acquisition. Collective robotics studies on the 
combined evolutionary learning of (collective) behavior and lan-
guage (Marocco et al., 2003) could be informative as well, as these 
dynamics would be difficult to test experimentally. These two 
examples, together with the other models of symbol  grounding 
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derive more precise predictions because they typically involve more 
realistic agent–environment interactions. Furthermore, embodied 
theories of cognition could provide insights for the realization of 
robots with sophisticated cognitive abilities that other design meth-
odologies have not been able to realize.
Throughout this article, we have proposed that cognitive robot-
ics is an ideal platform for studying embodied phenomena (includ-
ing developmental and social aspects), and vice versa that embodied 
theories can provide insights for the realization of novel, more 
efficacious, and reliable artificial cognitive systems. To help the 
realization of embodied computational models, this article has 
clarified the most important components and processes that such 
models should include, highlighted how the synthetic methodol-
ogy could help research in embodied cognition, and proposed six 
challenges for modelers. Our hope is that, in 5 or 10 years, we will 
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